Showing posts with label Kriegsmarine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kriegsmarine. Show all posts

Monday, June 8, 2015

Seekriegsleitung (Skl)



Provisionally formed on 01 Apr 1937 (Officially from April 1938) with the Chef des Marinekommandoamt. The two offices initially co-existed with the Chef des Marinekommandoamt doubling as the Chef des Stabes Seekriegsleitung and the Oberbefehlshaber der Marine as the Chef der Seekriegsleitung. From 23 Aug 1939 the Offices split and the Marinekommandoamt became a sub-office of the Seekriegsleitung with its own Chef and Stabes. On 01 May 1944 the Chef des Stabes der Seekriegsleitung was re-designated the Chef der Seekriegsleitung. The Office was tasked with the command of the merchant employment of fleet units, blockade runners, auxiliary cruisers & supply shipping.

Chef der Seekriegsleitung
Großadmiral Dr.phil.h.c. Erich Raeder     (01 Apr 1937-30 Jan 1943)
Großadmiral Karl Dönitz                (31 Jan 1943-01 May 1944)
Admiral Wilhelm Meisel                (01 May 1944-22 Jul 1945)

Chef des Stabes der Seekriegsleitung
Vizeadmiral Günther Guse          (01 Apr 1937-31 Oct 1938)
Vizeadmiral Otto Schniewind      (31 Oct 1938-12 Jun 1941)
Admiral Kurt Fricke          (13 Jun 1941-20 Feb 1943)
Vizeadmiral Wilhelm Meisel        (21 Feb 1943-30 Apr 1944)

Marineverbindungsoffizier der Skl zum Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres (Generalstab des Heeres)

Fregattenkapitän Friedrich Hüffmeier    (26 Aug 1939-12 Sep 1939)
Korvettenkapitän Hans von Davidson     (13 Sep 1939-00 Oct 1939)
Kapitän zur See Otto Loycke       (00 Oct 1939-00 Jul 1940)
Fregattenkapitän Alfred Schulze-Hinrichs             (00 Jul 1940-00 Nov 1940)
Kapitän zur See Otto Loycke       (00 Nov 1940-00 Nov 1941)
Kapitän zur See Konrad Weygold              (00 Nov 1941-00 Apr 1944)
Kapitän zur See Heinrich Rollmann           (00 Apr 1944-00 May 1944)
Kapitän zur See Norbert von Baumbach (i.V.)     (00 May 1944-00 Aug 1944)
Kapitän zur See Heinz-Dietrich von Conrady        (00 Aug 1944-00 May 1945)

Marineverbindungsoffizier der Skl zum Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe

Konteradmiral Wilhelm Mössel                  (26 Aug 1939-11 May 1945)


Sailors in Berlin


The plan
It started all with an phone-call. In the KTB of the OKM, with the date of 24th April of 1945 at 24:00 hrs, it is recorded as follows:
Kpt z.S. ASSMANN informed the OKM via phone about a Führerbefehl. HITLER had given the order to VAdm VOß to transport some battalions of the Kriegsmarine, fully equipped with all kind of infantry weapons, to Berlin. He wished the sailors to join the defense of Berlin.

The plan was for two battalions of sailors from 1. SStR to be air-lifted into Berlin already the next night(25th/26th of April). The units thus had to march immediately to distant air-fields.

- The so-called alarm battalion from Stralsund had to march to the seaplane base at Pütnitz near of Ribnitz, from where 175 men were to be flown with the 3./I./TG 1, which was equipped with a floatplane version of the Ju 52, and to Tutow, from where another 288 men were to be flown with Ju 352‘s of the Squadron „Mauß".

- Another alarm battalion from Rostock, with 476 men, had to march to the local air-field (this navy unit is unknown).

The following night (26th/27th of April), it was planned to transport a regiment from the island of Fehmarn, with some 1000 men, to Berlin from the airport of Rerik (sailors were part of the 1.FuMLAbt).

It seems, as GrAdm DÖNITZ wished to co-operate. He mobilized the 1.SStR in Stralsund and the 1.FuMLAbt on Fehmarn. These were also the „bravest" of his men, he would send to Berlin for the personal protection of the „beloved" Führer. The highest elite of a supreme-commander, was the impression of HITLER in his bunker under the Reichskanzlei.

1. SStR in Berlin
1.SStR (1. Schiffstamm-Regiment), which was the 1st naval instruction regiment, CO was Kpt z.S. Herbert ZOLLENKOPF, consisted of:
- 1.SStA (1. Schiffstamm-Abteilung), the 1st naval instruction battalion, CO was KKpt Wolfgang DITTMERS, stationed on Dänholm
- 2.SStA (2. Schiffstamm-Abteilung), the 2nd naval instruction battalion, CO was KKpt Franz MAYERHOEFFE, stationed in Flensburg-Mürwick
- 3.SStA (3. Schiffstamm-Abteilung), the 3rd naval instruction battalion, CO was FKpt Richard STEFFEN, stationed on the Schwedenschanze. At this time, this batallion was already mobilized as MarSchB 903(903rd naval infantry batallion). It was almost completely unarmed, except some carbines for the ranks, and very few submachine-guns for some officers. More about this battalion later.
- 4.SStA (4th Schiffstamm-Abteilung), the 4th naval instruction batallion, CO was KKpt Herbert BANZHAF, stationed from February of 1945 in Flensburg-Mürwick.
- SSS „Gorch Fock", CO was Kptl Wilhelm KAHLE.

The 1.SStR was augmented in manpower, as it wasn‘t only the Crew I/45 drafted, but also the Crew IV/45 was called to equip. It seems the Kriegsmarine had drafted these men to prevent them from being mowed down at the front, a process commonly known as „Heldenklau" (Heldenklau/Operation Heldenklau was catchy black humor Landser slang to describe the efforts by the High Command to replace the enormous and steadily increasing losses suffered by the Heer, especially on the Eastern front, during the last year of the war by combing the personnel of the rear (also derisively called Etappenhengste, or Home Front Studs, by the frontline soldiers) for men capable of carrying and firing a rifle or Panzerfaust. Literally translated, the word means something like 'grabbing the heroes' (Held = hero, klauen = slang word for stehlen, meaning to steal)).

Around noon on 25th April of 1945, there was the issuing of orders for the Operation „Berlin" or „Reichskanzlei". There they stood, not veterans with fighting experience of some years, but young, untrained soldiers of the 1927 – 1929 age group.

After the distribution of food, ammunition and weapons (mostly captured guns), hand-grenades, Panzerfäuste and some Panzerschrecks, they had to wait for transport. Many of them were from the special navy training course for HF-technology „Tegetthoff".

CO of this alarm-battalion was the recently decorated Kptlt Franz KUHLMANN. The officer corps of this battalion was a mix of officers of the entire 1.SStR. On the evening some busses and lorries transported part of them to Pütnitz. It remains unknown if they were transported to Berlin by the floatplane versions of the Ju-52 aircraft.

The rest of the unit arrived at the Tutow air-field at 22:00 hrs. Due to attacks of the Russian „Nähmaschinen" ('Sewing machines' – Landser slang for the slow-flying Soviet observation plane (max. speed 93 MPH), the Polikarpov Po-2 bi-plane, whose motor sounded like a sewing machine from the distance; it was regarded as a real nuisance, because it would sometimes also drop small fragmentation bombs that caused death or injury to the Landsers on the ground. To get even, they would fire their rifles at them, often bringing one down in the process) it looked like the transport flights would have to be postponed.

Once again there was a phone call from Berlin, GFM KEITEL pointed out the importance of this airlift. So, Mjr MAUß, CO of the „Großraumtransportstaffel" (large capacity transport squadron) , made all clearance for the commencement of the airlift. With great difficulty 5 or 6 Ju 352‘s were cleared to take-off. There had been a of loss of 5 planes (4 Ju 352‘s and 1 Ar 232) the night before(24th/25th of April) on a supply operation for the encircled 9th Army.

Between 01:35 hrs and 02:35 hrs on 26th of April all left Tutow. The aim was to land at the Berlin airport Gatow, as the Tempelhof airport wasn‘t available as of 23rd of April, due to heavy Russian attacks, and it fell to them the following night.

It seems each Ju 352 carried 40 soldiers, which is their maximum troop capacity. At least one Ju 352 had in addition 4 t of Panzerfäuste and Panzerschrecks. 40 soldiers and 4 t of ammunition means, that the aircraft was close to the maximum load of this type of plane.

OFw Herbert SCHULZ (G6 + .X) was the first to take-off from Tutow, as he received the landing permission in Gatow. His plane came under heavy attack from all types of weapons. With only one engine it was not possible to fly a full loaden Ju 352. OFw SCHULZ tried to make an emergency landing, but crash-landed. Somehow, the entire crew managed to escape the explosion of 4 of the Panzerfäuste. On 29th of April they returned to their squadron, which was stationed in Großenbrode at this time. Nothing is known about the fate of the 40 soldiers from this Ju 352.

StFw Kurt BECKER (G6 + RX) wasn‘t succesfull in landing at the Gatow airport, because of heavy anti-aircraft fire, he decided to return to Tutow, where he landed a 03:00 hrs. These soldiers, including the acting CO of the 1st coy, Kptlt BRANDT, were relieved of the fights in Berlin.
A further Ju 352 (G6 + .X) couldn‘t land in Gatow, due to heavy machine gun fire from the ground. The plane was hit in the landing gear and in the cockpit, however no crew or troops were wounded. To avoid an emergency landing on the small airport of Tutow – which could have lead to a stoppage of all air-lifts in Tutow- he made an emergency landing near Barth. The plane was destroyed, but again no one was injured.

OFw Paul KÖHLER (G6 + EX) left Tutow at 02:35 hrs, but needed almost two hours to land in Berlin-Gatow at 04:25 hrs. Maybe he had tried to land in Berlin-Staaken, according to an officer of the navy. After 20 minutes on ground he took off for Tutow, where he landed a 05:40.
In the literature about the battle of Berlin, whenever some reference is written about the German Kriegsmarine-sailors in Berlin, the numbers mentioned are far too high. According to a NCO, his plane was the last one landing in Gatow. In a wood near the airport his group of sailors joined up with another 40 sailors.

According to Olt z.S. Clemens ZUBORG, an Olt of the reserve and then adjutant in the staff of the alarm-battalion, mentioned the landing of 2 Ju 352‘s and the arrival of about 80, maybe 100 sailors, in the Reichskanzlei, which they had to defend.Kptl Franz KUHLMANN wrote in his memoirs about his meeting with Adolf HITLER: „At this date, I didn‘t know in which bad health HITLER was. I never thought that the signs of breaking up and the feelings of doom would led to such a chaos to the hierarchy of orders."

All officers of the unit survived the Battle of Berlin, except one, Lt z.S. BÖING who was killed in the garden of the Reichskanzlei by a mortar grenade.

There are many hints, of the landing of sailors (and other soldiers) on the so called „Ost-West-Achse". However no exact confirming source is available.

1. FuMLAbt in Berlin
On 25th April 1945 there was a issuing of an order, in which the CO of the 1.FuMLAbt, FKpt BORMANN (a brother of the Reichsleiter) tried to enlist volunteers for Berlin. He stressed that they had the duty of the close, personal protection of the Führer.

During the 26th April 1945 the first soldiers of the FuMLAbt were transported by MFP (German LTC‘s) from Puttgarden/Isle of Fehmarn to near the airport Rerik. On arriving at Rerik, they found that there were no aircraft available. They were ordered to sleep in a nearby hangar/shed. However at 22:00 hrs new orders were given. New groups of sailors were created at random. One witness said, one reduced coy marched to the airport. At the airport no „normal" transport planes were waiting for them, however there were aircraft of the F.d.F. (personal squadron of the Führer).
At least 3 planes were waiting:
- a Fw-200 „Condor" (CE + IC), the pilot was Hptm Joachim HÜBNER,
- a Ju-290 (9V + BK), the pilot was Lt WAGNER,
- a Ju-352 (KT + VJ), piloted by Olt SCHULTZE

Some sources say there could have been one other planes involved in this operation:
- a second Fw-200 „CONDOR", the pilot was Hptm Kurt HERZOG or Fw BAUER
HÜBNER‘s Fw-200 was the first to be loaded and to be clear to take-off. In his aircraft were 17 sailors. The 14 leather-chairs inside the aircraft were covered for protection by strips of canvas. The last 3 sailors sat on boxes of Panzerfäuste. The highest rank among the sailors was a NCO, OFm(~OBtsM) Julius LANGHALS.

The „Condor" was in a height of 120 meters, as it was hit by anti-aircraft fire. One of the right engines was burning, the pilot tried to make an emergency landing, but crashed into a house in Wilhelmshorst. 12 of the 17 survived, two because Russians transported them into a hospital, another two were hidden in Wilhelmshorst by civilians, and eight hid themselves in a nearby wood.
Coming near to Berlin, the surviving soldiers saw red flares, so another plane was hit by heavy anti-air fire and had to fly away for an emergency landing. A sailor of this unknown plane, said after the war, that they landed in Rerik again after 1 hour, because two engines stopped working, after these were hit by anti-aircraft fire.

But Lt WAGNER wrote in his after-flight report, he had to abort his flight with his Ju-290 after 15 minutes due a malfunction of engine No. 3. He landed back again in Rerik at 23:30 hrs, with 50 sailors on board. Also two sailors on board of WAGNER‘s Ju-290 mentioned, they were never hit by anti-aircraft fire, and returned with three engines to Rerik after a short time.

So another plane with four engines (maybe the Fw-200 of Hptm HERZOG/Fw BAUER)
was involved in this operation.

Olt SCHULTZE started with his Ju-352 at 23:40 hrs from Rerik. The airport Berlin-Gatow was under heavy Russian artillery fire, as he tried to land. At 01:00 hrs, after two attempts to land in vain, he succeeded in his third try. On board were some 40 sailors. They were used to defend the airport just a few minutes after landing. One officer, Lt z.S. Horst THIELE, was last seen in a machine-gun position.

SCHULTZE had to wait for about 36 minutes in Gatow, as he got the order to transport 25 wounded soldiers out of Berlin. His plane was the last to leave Gatow, as all other planes (maybe II./TG 4) didn‘t wait for wounded soldiers.

The MarSchB 903
As earlier mentioned, 3. SStA of the 1. SStR had already been mobilized by late April, and was known as MarSchB 903. CO was FKpt Richard STEFFEN. It was organized into 4 – 5 coys with 500 petty officers, and almost unarmed (except carbines for ranks and NCO‘s and some sub machine-guns for the officers).

On 24th April 1945 in Nauen, just a few kilometers from the Russian forces, FKpt STEFFEN was ordered by an unknown Kpt z.S. (maybe Kpt z.S. ASSMANN?) to wait for coming trucks, to be transported to Berlin. The trucks didn‘t come, so the battalion marched to Wustershausen, as Döberitz had just been occupied by the Red Army. On the next day in Wustershausen, they were stopped by a General and military police. STEFFEN was – this times in very harsh words – ordered back again to Berlin. He refused to lead his almost unarmed battalion to Berlin, as well armed Russian forces were on the route back to Berlin.

So, in Wustershausen 50 or 60 petty officers of the MarSchB 903, which volunteered to fight in Berlin – mostly coming from Berlin themselves – got properly armed with the help of the military police. With them, a platoon of recruits of the 3.MarInfDiv, were transported in the direction of Berlin. CO of this reduced coy with two platoons was an unknown Olt z.S..

On the way to Berlin they came under heavy Russian artillery fire. They dug in, and held their position for 3 days until the 28th April. Then they got the order to retreat to Strodehne. The CO of the recruit platoon, OFhr z.S. Walter NORTHOFF wrote in his memoirs: "The village was full of a small rest of an Wehrmacht‘s unit. This unit had only sub-altern officers (Lt‘s and Olt‘s) and NCO‘s, CO was Obstlt v.d. BOTTLEMBERG. He was a very impressive man, commanding a Regimental group within the Divisional group "von HAKE". He issued our coy the order to hold a bridgehead on the eastside of the Havel, as a corps and several thousands of refugees were retreating in our rear. He promised we would be rescued by pioneer‘s boats. In the next morning (30th April), we were transported back. After that, our coy became part of the vortex of general dissolving."

On 27th April the other 450 sailors of this battalion got more weapons and closed the road leading from Waren to Güstrow for one day. After this day this battalion vanished in the general retreat.

Other sailors in the battle
There were also small boats of the Kriegsmarine on the River/Lake Havel around Berlin. These were captured boats of the former Polish Vistula Flotilla. At least the former Polish patrol vessel KU-30 is mentioned to have been in action on the River/Lake Havel.

Also possible could be, that the navy-soldiers of the Marine-Verbindungs-Kommando (~navy liaison command) beim Führer (VAdm Voß) were part Kriegsmarine battle-group in Berlin.



By Michael Lenz

Z-plan – the Beginnings




When Admiral Raeder took over as chief of the Reichsmarine in 1928, there was massive residual distrust in the Reichmarine, due in large part to the role the Reichsmarine played in the mutiny of 1918. But there was also the realization that the ‘Tirpitz fleet’ built in the decades before WW-I, had cost so much and achieved so little, it was not a route they wanted to repeat. Every time a naval funding issue was run through Parliament, the fiercest debates raged turning each warship into a political football. Raeder strived to establish a multi-year modest program for ship construction , so when Hitler took over, Admiral Raeder would float a concept that would eventually become the Z Plan and not be completed before 1949. Hitler had openly stated his opposition to any naval funding due to the damage this funding had on WW-I. He envisaged the Reichmarine as a purely coastal defense force.

It took all Raeder could do, to get Hitler to at least reconsider the Reichmarine role in the new Reich. Hitler also harbored a fantasy that the strategic conflict with the UK, could be avoided if a deal could be struck. He imagined this deal focusing on Germany avoiding any conflict with the UK, and in return Hitler was given a free reign in Eastern Europe. He even believed the UK and Germany could form an alliance against the USA. Needless to say the UK and the USA made it clear they would not allow Hitler a free hand anywhere as early as 1935…but Hitler clung to his believe that they would change their minds ‘when the chips were down’. This was not that different for the fantasy most of the 1920s German generals had surrounding the League of Nations bailing Germany out of any war with Poland. At worse Hitler believed he could avoid direct confrontation with the UK until the mid-1940s, when Germany would be more prepared for war with the west. This despite the fact that in WW-I, war with France had immediately implied war with the UK and its Commonwealth and indirectly America.

In the Schleicher-Mueller Government, Defense minister Groener had forced the Reichmarine Admirals to craft a naval force & doctrine able to dominate the Baltic Sea and prevent the Polish and French navies from working together against Germany in any future war. In this way he could argue that it contributed directly to ‘national security’ and get the cabinet to committee to multi-year stable funding that allowed the light cruisers and pocket battleships to be built. Admiral Raeder took this idea one step further, if he could not prepare for the inevitable direct war with the UK , he would instead redirect the Reichmarine towards defeating the French or Italian navies in European waters and interdicting the overseas French commerce. …but he dropped hints that this force would be geared towards a later war with the UK. Hitler approved and the planning process began. Raeder’s initial 1934 plan he drew up was for:
8 x pocket battle cruiser
3 x aircraft carriers
18 x cruisers
48 destroyers and a total of 72 U-boats

But this was not enough, within a year many meetings of the Admiral s changed the thrust of the discussion. Raeder using the French navy as reference demanded parity with the French fleet or a navy 1/3 the size of the RN fleet. The Admirals interpreted this as 35% and later after study reported 50% of the RN fleet was needed. Already the focus had shifted from France to the UK, for the upcoming “1935 Naval Treaty”. Strategies for using this force were as diverse as the Admirals. Donitz proposed 300 U-boats , while Heyes proposed a fleet of dozen surface raiders loosely operating with U-boat flotillas , while Admiral Carls proposed four Carrier groups each with an aircraft carrier, a battle cruiser , a heavy cruiser a couple of flotillas of destroyers and several U-boat flotillas. With Hitler’s promise of unrestrained rearmament, the Admirals placed their orders and before long all the capital ship yards were full. But the orders appeared geared to fill all the strategies at the same time, while Hitler muddled things further by demanding more and bigger battleships at the expense of surface raiders and air craft carriers. On order were two 35,000 ton 11” gun battleships, two 50,000 ton 15” gun battleships; two 30,000 ton Aircraft carrier; 5 x 18,000 ton 8” gun heavy cruisers and 5 x 20,000 ton fleet tankers. That’s 11 capital ships and 5 giant Auxiliary tankers.

Meanwhile the smaller escort ship yards received orders for 36 U-boats totaling 14,000 tons and ~ 20 Destroyers plus 17 Torpedoboot as well as at least 20 smaller coast craft. For the first time in decades the naval shipyards were filled to capacity. The hulls for the capital ships should have taken 2-3 years from keel to launching with another year to commission, while the escorts should have taken 2-3 years to complete and the coastal craft 18-24 months. In practice the supply of steel needed to sustain this level of production fell to about ½ the construction needs and ended up delaying completion by 1-2 years. So by war time only ½ of the capital ships and escorts were completed when they all should have been commissioned by 1940. What went wrong?

Steel production through the late 1930s stabilized at ~20 million tons per year however increasing amounts of steel was being diverted to construction projects like the barracks housing for the extra 2 million soldiers needed for the ever expanding Heer, while the ‘Westwall’ fortification consumed enough steel to finish the capital warship program on schedule. The ammo needed for the ballooning Heer fell further behind so much that by the late 1930s at most 2 weeks supplies were available for the divisions. By the start of the war 1/3 of all war related industry was being poured into construction and the amount of money being spent each year on housing was equal to the amount of funds spent on armaments. The whole rearmament program was spiraling out of control, due to a lack of a central direction and strategy, which is a political animal.

But Admiral Raeder was not finished yet. In 1936 he added two more aircraft carriers and 6 x 50-60 ,000 ton ; 16” gun battleships plus a couple of light cruisers to the orders, even though , due to the delays none could even be even laid down until 1938- 1940. After May 1938 Czech crisis, Hitler started to make noises that maybe the UK would have to be attacked sooner than expected….although he still clung to the believe that they would remain neutral. Hitler conceded that the Autarky economic goal would likely not be reached in the short term and traditional supplies of resource would have to come by sea during war time, which meant enlarged convoy escort fleet. But Hitler also demanded more and bigger battleships. German naval strategy was lost.

Admiral Heyes had presented his doctrine based on combining a fleet of a dozen pocket battleships with 2-3 dozen light cruisers and scores of U-boats to operate in the North and South Atlantic and interdict UK shipping lanes. At that time the Kriegsmarine [KM] had only 3-5 x surface raiders and would only get 2 more before the expected 1940 Wehrmacht operational date. Worse the cruiser fleet at that time would be less than a dozen warships of which ½ were light cruisers with structural weakness that limited sea worthiness in the open ocean, due to welded construction. Even with an unrealistic construction plan, such a fleet could not be realized before 1944/45.

Despite the completely unrealistic political assumption imbedded in the Heyes strategy, this became the basis of the KM so called “Z Plan” as it approached war, augmented by Donitz limited U-boat fleet. Although alternatives to the Z plan were proposed they all evolved around slight changes to the ratio of battleships to pocket battle cruisers. Admiral Raeder tried several times to present this plan to Hitler , but Hitler harshly criticized the plan due to lack of battleships sending Raeder back to the admirals . Raeder tendered his resignation which Hitler clearly rejected. The planned fleet at that point was 365 warships completed by 1949, just above the WW-I Imperial fleet of 324 warships. In October 1938 the revised “Z Plan” included
10 battleships
15 pocket battle cruisers
5 heavy Cruisers
24 light cruisers
36 small cruisers
8 aircraft carriers
249 Submarines
Not mentioned are the 70 destroyers and 78 Torpedoboot also planned along with another 300 other smaller warships.

By then the war had begun and everything changed. Europe was overrun quickly meaning economic autarky was already de facto in place and the large overseas escort fleet was not need. Worse since Hitler and Goering believed the war was already won , there was no need to go to war with the UK, so the whole Z plan was cancelled since most of the ships would be completed after the war. Over the 1930s the German navy had suffered from lack political trust from the past, a lack of consistent resource allocation or long term planning to ship construction, a lack of Admiral consensus on the best approach and a lack of support from Hitler on the course that was chosen. Wilhelm Deist describes their reaction to all these stress and strains as ‘autistic’ and that’s what Germany got, an ‘Autistic navy’.

Sources :
"Germany and the Second World War" Vol-1 [Ed : Deist, Messerschmitt, Volkmann and Wette]
"The German Military in the age of Total War" Wilhelm Deist
"The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament " Wilhelm Deist
"War and Economy in the Third Reich" Richard Overy.
The Oxford Companion to World War-II [Ed: Dear and Foot]